Supreme Court Reverses Fourth Circuit on Party Presentation in Immigration Judges Case

 

In October 2021, the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), under the Department of Justice, implemented a policy requiring immigration judges to obtain supervisory approval before making public speeches or statements related to their official duties. The policy aimed to ensure that such speech aligned with EOIR’s official positions and did not carry the appearance of official endorsement.

The National Association of Immigration Judges (NAIJ), representing its members, challenged the policy in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. NAIJ asserted that the policy violated its members’ First and Fifth Amendment rights. Both parties acknowledged the framework of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), which generally channels most federal employees’ work-related grievances through the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and the Office of Special Counsel, rather than allowing direct access to federal district courts. NAIJ argued that its constitutional claims fell outside this channeling scheme.

The District Court dismissed the claims, holding that they were covered by the CSRA’s exclusive administrative review process. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed that the claims were covered under CSRA precedent (including Elgin v. Department of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012)) and that Congress intended to preclude district court jurisdiction. However, the Fourth Circuit sua sponte raised and relied on concerns about the current functionality of the MSPB (e.g., quorum issues, removal of officials, and potential changes in the administrative scheme’s effectiveness due to recent political developments). It vacated the dismissal and remanded for factfinding on whether the CSRA continued to operate as Congress intended, without the parties having briefed or argued this broader issue.

Issues

The primary issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Fourth Circuit violated the principle of party presentation by deciding the case on a novel ground neither party had raised—specifically, by questioning the ongoing viability of the CSRA’s channeling scheme based on external factual and political circumstances, rather than limiting its review to the arguments presented (i.e., whether NAIJ’s specific claims were “covered” actions under the CSRA).

A secondary issue (not reached in the per curiam opinion) concerned the merits of applying the CSRA’s exclusive review scheme to constitutional challenges against workplace speech policies for immigration judges.

Decision

In a unanimous per curiam opinion (5 pages), the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, reversed the Fourth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. The Court held that the Fourth Circuit’s approach violated the well-established principle of party presentation, which requires courts in the adversarial system to decide cases based on the issues framed and argued by the parties, not to raise and resolve new theories sua sponte.

The Court cited its recent decision in Clark v. Sweeney (2025) and precedents like United States v. Sineneng-Smith (2020), emphasizing that federal courts are “passive instruments” that rely on parties to frame issues. It analogized the Fourth Circuit’s action to granting relief on unasserted claims, which “transgressed the party-presentation principle.” Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Barrett, filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the reversal and further arguing on the merits that the CSRA requires channeling of these claims to the MSPB, regardless of current administrative functionality or political changes.

Analysis of the Decision

This decision is narrow and procedural, focusing on judicial restraint and the adversarial process rather than resolving the underlying First Amendment merits of the EOIR speech policy or broadly reinterpreting the CSRA. It reinforces that appellate courts cannot unilaterally expand the scope of litigation to address systemic concerns (here, MSPB quorum and independence issues) without input from the parties, preventing courts from acting as “roving commissions.”

The ruling benefits the government (EOIR) by reinstating the District Court’s dismissal on CSRA grounds, at least pending further proceedings on remand consistent with the opinion. It chastises the Fourth Circuit for overstepping, echoing dissents from rehearing en banc. Justice Thomas’s concurrence signals potential support for a strict application of CSRA channeling in future cases, even amid administrative disruptions, emphasizing statutory text and precedent over evolving “facts on the ground.”

For immigration judges and federal employees, the case underscores the difficulty of bringing constitutional challenges to workplace policies directly in district court. It does not foreclose all avenues but directs them through administrative processes first. The decision has limited direct impact on asylum or general immigrant rights but is relevant to the administration of immigration courts.

Link to full opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/25-767_7758.pdf

Citation: Margolin v. National Association of Immigration Judges, 608 U.S. ___ (2026) (per curiam).