Tenth Circuit Holds Nondiscretionary Refugee Eligibility Determination Reviewable Under the Administrative Procedure Act
In 2005, Agnes Mukantagara, a Rwandan national, was admitted to the United States as a refugee under 8 U.S.C. § 1157, based on her claims of past persecution. Her minor son, Ebenezer Shyaka, was granted derivative refugee status as her dependent. In 2007, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) placed a hold on Mukantagara's refugee status and revoked her travel documents amid suspicions of her involvement in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. By 2008, USCIS launched a formal investigation.
In 2016, USCIS concluded that Mukantagara had participated
in the genocide, triggering the "persecutor bar" under 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42), which excludes individuals who have ordered, incited, assisted, or
participated in persecution from qualifying as refugees. Consequently, USCIS
terminated her refugee status under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4), finding that she did
not meet the Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA) definition of
"refugee" at the time of admission. This termination automatically
extended to Shyaka.
Mukantagara vehemently denied the allegations, claiming
USCIS relied on fabricated evidence from a politically motivated Rwandan
organization tied to the ruling party. The government then initiated removal
proceedings against both Mukantagara and Shyaka.
During these proceedings, an immigration judge (IJ) found
Mukantagara credible and granted her asylum, rejecting the genocide claims.
However, the IJ denied asylum to Shyaka, ruling that he did not independently
qualify and had aged out of derivative eligibility (he was under 21 in 2005 but
over 21 by the asylum application date). Both parties appealed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA remanded Mukantagara's asylum grant for
further review and affirmed the denial for Shyaka. On remand, the IJ again
granted Mukantagara asylum. Shyaka petitioned the Tenth Circuit for review, but
the petition was abated pending this case's outcome. The BIA also abated the
government's appeal of Mukantagara's second asylum grant.
Procedurally, Mukantagara and Shyaka sued USCIS and
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., challenging the refugee status
termination as arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful. The government moved to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9), which funnels
review of removal-related actions to courts of appeals. The district court
dismissed, but the Tenth Circuit reversed in Mukantagara v. DHS, 67
F.4th 1113 (10th Cir. 2023), holding § 1252(b)(9) inapplicable since the
termination was separate from removal. On remand, the government again moved to
dismiss, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (barring review of discretionary
immigration actions), APA non-reviewability for discretionary/non-final
actions, and merits failures on some claims. The district court dismissed
solely on § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) grounds in Mukantagara v. Mayorkas, 736 F.
Supp. 3d 1117 (D. Utah 2024). Mukantagara and Shyaka appealed.
Issues
The central issue was whether 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review
"any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of
Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to
be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary"—applies to
the nondiscretionary eligibility determination in the refugee status
termination process under 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4). Sub-issues included whether §
1157(c)(4) involves a two-step process (nondiscretionary eligibility followed
by discretionary termination), and whether Supreme Court precedents like Patel
v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022), and Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 604 U.S. 6
(2024), extend the jurisdictional bar to such eligibility reviews.
Relevant laws:
Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal
and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)
does not bar judicial review of USCIS's nondiscretionary eligibility
determination under § 1157(c)(4)—specifically, whether the noncitizen met the
INA's "refugee" definition at admission. Thus, the district court has
subject-matter jurisdiction under the APA to review this step. The court
declined to address the government's alternative arguments (e.g., APA non-reviewability),
leaving them for the district court.
Analysis
The court began by interpreting § 1157(c)(4), which states:
"The refugee status of any alien (and of the spouse or child of the alien)
may be terminated by the Secretary pursuant to such regulations as the
Secretary may prescribe if the Secretary determines that the alien was not in
fact a refugee within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42) of this title at the
time of the alien's admission." Drawing on precedents like Wilkinson v.
Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024), the court identified a two-step process: (1)
a nondiscretionary eligibility determination (did the alien meet the
"refugee" definition at entry?), and (2) a discretionary decision to
terminate if ineligible. USCIS's regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 207.9, mandates
termination upon ineligibility, reinforcing the first step's nondiscretionary
nature.
The court rejected the government's view that the entire
process is discretionary, citing statutory language. Phrases like "may
prescribe" refer to regulatory authority, not the eligibility check.
"May be terminated" and "if the Secretary determines" imply
discretion in step two, but step one requires a factual-legal assessment of
statutory criteria, akin to mandatory predicates in other INA provisions (e.g.,
Temporary Protected Status under § 1254a or adjustment under § 1159(b)).
Circuits like the Second (Maiwand v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 101 (2d Cir.
2007)) and Ninth (Kaganovich v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2006))
have similarly viewed termination as requiring initial ineligibility.
On jurisdiction, the court held § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) only
bars truly discretionary actions "specified" as such.
Nondiscretionary eligibility checks fall outside this, per analogous cases:
e.g., Mejia Rodriguez v. DHS, 562 F.3d 1137 (11th Cir. 2009) (TPS
eligibility reviewable); Hosseini v. Johnson, 826 F.3d 354 (6th Cir.
2016) (refugee adjustment eligibility reviewable). The government conceded
USCIS must resolve eligibility and cannot skip it.
The court distinguished Patel v. Garland, which
broadly interpreted § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)'s bar on "judgments regarding"
relief in removal proceedings, including eligibility findings. Patel
does not control § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which is narrower, focusing on
discretion. Here, the termination is standalone, not tied to removal.
Similarly, Bouarfa v. Mayorkas barred review of purely discretionary
visa revocations under § 1155 (no eligibility threshold), but explicitly left
open threshold determinations. Other government-cited cases (Geda v. Dir.
USCIS, 126 F.4th 835 (3d Cir. 2025); Cheejati v. Blinken, 106 F.4th
388 (5th Cir. 2024)) involved discretionary processing regulations, not
eligibility assessments.
Exercising appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
the court reviewed de novo, placing the burden on plaintiffs. It concluded the
eligibility step's nondiscretionary character preserves APA review, potentially
allowing Mukantagara to challenge USCIS's genocide finding. The remand directs
the district court to consider remaining issues, emphasizing judicial
oversight's role in preventing arbitrary terminations.
Citation for This Decision
The decision can be cited as: Mukantagara v. Noem,
No. 24-4071, 2026 WL 111366 (10th Cir. Jan. 12, 2026).
Link for Accessing This Decision
https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/files/opinions/010111366275.pdf
Comments
Post a Comment