Attorney General Garland rules in Matter of Negusie that Persecutor Bar contains no exceptions for duress or coercion

Facts: The applicant, Daniel Girmai Negusie, entered the U.S. as a stowaway in 2004. In 2005, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal due to the persecutor bar (for assisting in persecution in Eritrea), but granted a deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the IJ’s decision in 2007. The Fifth Circuit denied review. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in 2009 (Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511), directing the BIA to determine whether duress or coercion is an exception to the persecutor bar. In 2018, the BIA recognized a duress exception but found that Negusie did not qualify. Attorney General Barr vacated the BIA’s 2018 decision in 2020, ruling no duress exception exists (Matter of Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120). The BIA dismissed Negusie’s appeal in March 2021, affirming denial of asylum/withholding and granting CAT deferral. Attorney General Garland referred the case to himself in October 2021 and stayed the BIA’s order but took no further action.

Issue: Whether the persecutor bar under INA §§ 208(b)(2)(A)(i) and 241(b)(3)(B)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") contains an exception for duress or coercion?

Law: The persecutor bar under INA §§ 208(b)(2)(A)(i) and 241(b)(3)(B)(i) renders an alien ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal if there is evidence they ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

Decision: On October 22, 2025, the Attorney General vacated the stay of the BIA’s March 16, 2021 order. Therefore, Matter of Negusie, 28 I. & N. Dec. 120 (A.G. 2020) (Barr opinion) is now the operative decision.  The “persecutor bar” is absolute and contains no exception for duress or coercion, and applies even if participation was involuntary. The burden is entirely on the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the bar does not apply if any evidence suggests it might; the government has no burden to establish its applicability.

Citation: 29 I&N Dec. 285 (A.G. 2025)

Public Access Link: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1416586/dl?inline

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